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Introduction 
It is exceedingly difficult to think about our natural environment clearly. It is 
often challenging to get scholars to agree even on what a definition of nature or 
the natural environment might entail. Part of this difficulty stems from 
understanding exactly where human beings stand in relation to the natural 
environment. Does “nature” include humanity? Must the concept of 
“wilderness” exclude people in order for it to be authentically wild (Nash 1982)? 
In order to have a functional environmental ethics that can have a meaningful 
impact on the issue of sustainability, a clear understanding of the environment 
or nature is a fundamental prerequisite.  
For the purposes of this essay, I am employing the term “nature” in one 
of its common usage forms: the totality of everything on the planet. The term 
nature refers to the natural world. In his The Idea of Nature, R.G. Collingwood 
identified three distinct ideas of nature that he called the Greek, the 
Renaissance, and the Modern. The Greek view considered nature to be like a 
living organism, closely fusing what might be called mind/spirit/soul with the 
material world. The Renaissance view, marked by the Scientific Revolution, 
perceived of nature as mechanical, operating according to natural laws that are 
eternal and unchanging. The modern view is a merging of the two and can be 
best identified in a shorthand fashion with evolution. Nature is once again 
reanimated with life, but it operates according to laws that provide an 
explanation for change (Collingwood 1960). 
 A first step in the process of developing a new environmental ethics is 
changing how we think about the environment. Instead of thinking of the 
environment as an object that is acted upon, it might be useful to think of the 
environment as a space that human beings act within. Thinking about the 
environment in terms of space rather than as an object puts both sustainability 
and ethics in a different light and opens up the possibility of drawing from 
different fields for fresh insights. Architecture is one such field. Architecture is 
fundamentally about the organization of space. This essay will look at the 
works of Christian Norberg Schultz and Bernard Tschumi in an effort to see 
what their theories about architecture offer for thinking about the 
environment. I will employ the Mosel River in Germany as a concrete example 
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that illustrates how to think anew about environmental conservation and 
ethics. Finally, the essay will suggest that ideas from Aristotle and Actor 
Network Theory can help provide a paradigm within which we can think about 
nature in a way that offers an alternative framing to questions about the 
environment. 
Environment as Object vs. Environment as Space 
One reason for the difficulty surrounding our understanding of the 
environment is that many, at least in the West, are trapped in a nostalgic 
relationship with the environment. The environmental historian Donald 
Worster suggests that this nostalgia is, at least in part, a response to 
industrialization—a harkening back to a simpler time. Worster indicates that 
this nostalgia may be our only hope for salvation. For him, this nostalgia takes 
him back to a time and place when nature was more pristine and humanity 
treated its environment with more respect—Worster has in mind the Blue 
Ridge Mountains during the late 18th and early 19th century (1993). But even 
Worster’s characterization reveals a common limitation in how people think 
and talk about the environment; nature is viewed as an object that is acted 
upon and controlled by human beings. The characterization is fundamentally 
anthropocentric and instrumentalist. Whether nature is reduced to an object 
that must be overcome or, in Worster’s sense of nostalgia, protected, the 
underlying epistemological view is similar. This characterization of nature is 
most clearly illustrated in the title of a recent and deservedly well-received book 
on rivers, focusing on the Rhine and Oder, simply called: The Conquest of 
Nature: Water, Landscape and the Making of Modern Germany, by David 
Blackbourn. The conquest of a waterway is not a view that is limited to Prussia. 
In Landscape and Memory, Simon Schama offers a revealing anecdote: The first 
English hydraulic engineering feat was the construction of the flood defenses of 
Dagenham in the early eighteenth century.  
To celebrate the achievement, the king’s commissioners of work 
had, it seems, held a great whitebait dinner every spring as if 
somehow the appearance of the fish were a sign that God would 
indeed Save the Hanoverian King and his fisherman from the 
tides of flood and war (Schama 1995, 353).  
The instrumentalist view of nature is fundamentally about the 
organization (and occasionally rearranging) of space by humans. Architecture 
may well have some insight into thinking about nature and ways to rethink the 
human relationship to nature. Fundamentally, architecture is about the 
organization of space. How we organize space reflects our understanding of 
reality; our understanding of space impacts how we act and has implications 
for how we understand conservation and how we determine ethical action. For 
example, as the Norwegian architect, architectural historian, and theorist 
Building Within Space: Thoughts Towards an Environmental Ethics 
 
 
82 
 
Christian Norberg-Schulz points out, during the Middle Ages reality was 
understood as an ordered cosmos (Norberg-Schulz 1988, 17). Gothic 
architecture reinforced this view. Elements of reality were qualitative and their 
significance was determined by divine revelation (Panofsky 1976). Actions and 
ethical conduct were proscribed by divine revelation. Norberg-Schulz suggests 
that during the modern era humanity set itself rationally and critically opposite 
from the world. By situating itself opposite the world, the world becomes 
something outside that human beings act upon rather than act within. 
According to Norberg-Schulz, Functionalist Architecture was the epitome of 
this world view of man ordering the world. The functionalist notion of form 
following function was indicative of the view that human constructions 
occurred in a virtually empty geometric space in which human beings 
proscribed meaning. 
In Genius loci, Norberg-Schulz suggests that human-made places relate 
to nature in three ways. First, human beings want to make the natural structure 
more precise. This helps them to visualize an “understanding of nature” 
(Norberg-Schulz 1979, 17). An individual builds what he or she has seen—an 
enclosure for delimited space, a Mal for centralized space, and a path for where 
nature suggests a direction. Second, built spaces can complement nature, adding 
to what is lacking. This leads to the third way: architecture as a way to 
symbolize humanity’s understanding of nature. While this reading of the 
relationship between nature and architecture is certainly more sympathetic 
than a functionalist view, the notion that it symbolizes humanity’s 
understanding of nature has some epistemological difficulties (Norberg-Schulz 
1979). The position outlined is fundamentally anthropocentric. For an example, 
where an open field ends and a forest begins does not necessarily suggest a 
boundary or enclosure. Animals pass from one to another without any concern 
save perhaps bumping their head on a low-lying branch. Similarly the notion of 
complementarity posited by Norberg-Schulz assumes a lack that humans need 
to address; however, I would argue that the lack is not in nature, but in what 
people need from a particular place. 
Norberg-Schulz’s intellectual approach strongly suggests that he was 
heavily influenced by the work of Martin Heidegger. In Architecture: Meaning 
and Place, Norberg-Schulz writes: “Only when space becomes a system of 
meaningful places, does it become alive to us. … ‘Landscape’ is structured in 
advance. It contains a system of existing ways which define our possibilities of 
movement” (Norberg-Schulz 1988, 24). He identifies the task of the architect as 
giving the system of meaningful places form such that they can receive the 
necessary content. In the chapter that explores the implications of Heidegger’s 
thought on architecture, Norberg-Schulz asserts that “Being-in-the-world” 
implies a man-made environment. To explore this concept further, Norberg-
Schulz turns to Heidegger’s discussion of the Greek temple in order to 
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understand “Being-in-the world,” or how things become what they are (see 
Heidegger 1971). 
The Greeks called this emerging and rising in itself and in all 
things is called phusis. It clears and illuminates, also, that on 
which man bases his dwelling. We call this ground dwelling. We 
call this ground the earth.… Earth is that whence the arising 
brings back and shelters without violation. In things that arise, 
earth is present as a sheltering agent (Norberg-Schulz 1988, 39).  
The notion of a proper relationship between a person and a physical 
structure, and between a physical structure and its natural environment, is not 
limited to homes. Norberg-Schulz’s elegant excursion on the “Earth and Sky” of 
Jorn Utzon’s Bagsvaerd Church reveals his Heideggarian bend in viewing 
architecture. As he starts his description of the space contained by the church, 
Norberg Schulz reminds the reader that a religious encounter takes places 
between earth and sky, as everything else does. “It means that the church 
should make an ‘understood world manifest’” (Norberg-Schulz 1988, 227). 
But contrary to Heidegger’s view, and Norberg-Schulz’s, this 
understanding that takes place between earth and sky does not occur without 
violation. Another architect, Bernard Tschumi has some observations that 
merit consideration in this problem. In Architecture and Disjunction, he writes,  
Indeed, architecture constitutes the reality of experience while 
this reality gets in the way of the overall vision. Architecture 
constitutes the abstraction of absolute truth, while this very truth 
gets in the way  of feeling. We cannot both experience and think 
that we experience. ‘The concept of dog does not bark,’ the 
concept of space is not in space (Tschumi 1994, 48). 
Tschumi posits two premises to begin a chapter entitled “Violence of 
Architecture”: first, “[T]here is no architecture without action, no architecture 
without events, no architecture without program”; and second “[B]y extension, 
there is no architecture without violence” (1994, 121). The first of these 
statements runs against the mainstream of architectural thought by refusing to 
favor space at the expense of action. The second argues that although the logic 
of objects and the logic of people are independent in their relations to the world, 
they inevitably face one another in an intense confrontation. Any relationship 
between a building and its users is one of violence, for any given use means the 
intrusion of a human body into a given space, the intrusion of one order into 
another. This intrusion is inherent in the idea of architecture; any reduction of 
architecture to its spaces at the expense of its events is as simplistic as the 
reduction of architecture to its facades. 
Tschumi writes: 
By ‘violence,’ I do not mean the brutality that destroys physical or 
emotional integrity but a metaphor for the intensity of a 
relationship between an individual and their surrounding 
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spaces…. Architecture’s violence is fundamental and unavoidable, 
for architecture is linked to events in the same way that the guard 
is linked to the prisoner, the police to the criminal, the doctor to 
the patient, order to chaos. This also suggests that actions qualify 
spaces as much as spaces qualify actions; that space and action 
are inseparable and that no proper interpretation of architecture, 
drawing or notation can refuse to consider this fact (Tschumi 
1994, 121-122).  
What must first be determined is whether this relation between action 
and space is symmetrical—two diverging interests (people vs. spaces) affecting 
one another in a commensurable way—or asymmetrical, a relation in which 
one interest, whether space or people, clearly dominates the other. If the 
relationship is asymmetrical, then that would suggest that symmetry is 
connected to ethical action, and by extension that symmetry is required for 
environmental conservation. 
Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Action in Space: The Mosel 
River 
What I would like to suggest is that the violence proposed by Norberg-Schulz 
and Heidegger is asymmetrical and that this is most clearly demonstrated in a 
discussion of rivers. Here an examination of bridges will help clarify the point. 
According to Heidegger, the bridge does more than connect the banks; it is 
what allows the banks of the river to emerge as banks. The river ceases to be a 
boundary, and the other side of the river is brought into the sphere of 
experience for those who built the bridge. “The bridge gathers the ground as 
landscape around the stream” (Heidegger 1971b 152). The bridge permits the 
river to continue its course but also allows mankind to go on with its necessary 
business. Heidegger writes, “The bridge is a location. As such a thing, it allows a 
space into which earth and heaven, divinities and mortals are admitted” 
(Heidegger 1971b, 155). Human life takes place on earth and the bridge makes 
that manifest. Norberg-Schulz notes that cities divided by a river use a bridge to 
become a connective way (Norberg-Schulz 1988).  
But the connection that Norberg-Schulz notes privileges the human 
perspective. The connection was not there in nature; nor was it necessary. 
Rather, the connection was a human action designed to complete nature. The 
relationship is asymmetrical because a type of violence has been done to the 
river. It has been viewed as an obstacle to be overcome. The river is, in a sense, 
the enemy that must be conquered. It appears that the taming of rivers is a 
frequent topic of discussion by environmental historians. Whether it is Richard 
White’s The Organic Machine, about the damming of the Columbia River, or 
Mark Cioc’s The Rhine: An Eco-biography 1815-2000, the focus of the 
environmental historian tends to be on how mankind attempts to control 
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nature and the consequences of those efforts. This approach reveals the 
fundamental relationship between human built-spaces and nature as one of 
violence and control. Cioc’s eco-biography brilliantly traces the efforts to turn 
the Rhine into the perfect canal. His work reinforces the asymmetrical 
relationship. Each technological attempt to tame the “wild Rhine” produces the 
desired effect and an unanticipated side-effect that requires another 
technological remedy. The efforts that Cioc examines betray an instrumental 
and anthropocentric view of nature. Moreover, the actions inadvertently treat 
rivers like the empty kind of space that Heidegger refers to as zwischenraum 
(in-between space) in his discussion of highways (Heidegger 1977). Both the 
river and the road are treated as empty spaces. The river itself is unimportant 
except as an avenue of transportation to particular locations. Environmental 
historians, who tend to be receptive to the notion of human arrogance 
regarding nature, unconsciously share and perpetuate this perspective. The 
works of Blackbourn, White, and Cioc have noted the damage done by people 
and now recent attempts to at least halt, if they cannot restore, the damage that 
has been done by the last two hundred plus years. The action in this 
relationship with the environment remains asymmetrical, with one side doing 
violence, both symbolic and real, to the other. 
To bring this to a more concrete level, I will turn to the example of the 
Mosel (Moselle) River. The largest tributary of the Rhine, the Mosel River flows 
some 339 miles through northeastern France, Luxembourg, and western 
Germany. It rises in the Vosges Mountains in France, in two headwaters uniting 
near St-Maurice. It flows north past Metz and is canalized from Thionville to its 
confluence with the Rhine at Koblenz, Germany. In France, there are a number 
of important coal deposits that facilitate the mining and steel industries in the 
Moselle valley; whereas in Germany it is the home of some of the best German 
wines.  
A quick search of the books about the Mosel River turns up Jean 
Cermakian’s The Moselle: River and Canal from the Roman Empire to the 
European Economic Community (1975) as yet another example of humanity’s 
attempt to alter nature to fit its needs. Although literature on the Mosel is not 
substantial, this does not diminish the importance of the river itself. As 
Cermakian suggests, the river has quite a history and could provide a useful 
test case for a study of how to think about rivers and their relationship to 
human activity. The Mosel has been an important river at least since the 
founding of Trier in the first century BCE as a Roman outpost in Gaul for 
protection against the barbaric Germanic tribes. The earliest written 
references to the Mosel that we find are in Caesar. In his Conquest of Gaul, the 
final conquest of the Treveri under Labienus appears to have taken place next 
to a river that may well have been the Mosel. The battle took place beside a 
river with steep banks that was difficult to cross; historian Edith Mary 
Wightman posits that this description matches the Mosel (1971). By the time of 
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Tacitus, the economic importance of Trier made the Mosel an important river 
as the Romans attempted to create a network of transportation routes on land 
and water between the Rhine. The fourth-century poet Ausonius has a poem 
entitled “Mosella,” which is the longest single writing from antiquity that 
discusses the Mosel and offers us insight on how to think about rivers 
differently.  
Ostensibly about a trip from Bingen to Trier, the poem is much more. In 
the first two parts, Ausonius tells the reader where he is going and praises the 
river he is about to travel. The subsequent four sections praise the natural 
beauty of the river and all that it has to offer, to both the human and the divine. 
The section on the gods is significant in that it emphasizes the connection 
between the natural and the divine. There are two quick points to make about 
what Ausonius writes. First, he offers praise to the natural beauty of the Mosel 
and all that it has to offer to humans and the divine as both a playground and 
sanctuary. The clumsy Satyr cannot grasp the water Nymph, and is left 
clutching yielding water. Even viewing the references to Satyrs and Nymphs as 
poetic license rather than theological truth, the poem still posits the view of the 
divine as in harmony with nature. Second, as Ausonius gets ready to embark on 
his trip along the river he writes: 
Go now, and with Phrygian slabs lay out smooth floors spreading 
and expensive marble through thy fretted halls! But I, scorning 
what wealth and riches have bestowed, will marvel at Nature’s 
handiwork, and not at that wherein ruin wantons, recklessly 
prodigal and delighting in her waste. Here firm sands spread the 
moist shores, and the foot resting on them leaves no recording 
print behind (Ausonius 1961, 229, lines 48-54). 
Ausonius distinguishes between man-made wealth and the wealth of 
nature. The next two sections focus on that natural wealth, the vast variety of 
fishes that can be found in the Mosel and what, undoubtedly, is still the single 
identifying feature of the Mosel: its vineyards. 
Ausonius describes some of the villas that he sees along the river: 
This one stands high upon a mass of natural rock, this rests upon 
the verge of the jutting bank, this stands back and claims the river 
for its own, making it prisoner in an enfolding bay. Yon occupies a 
hill whose bulk looms high about the stream, claiming free 
prospect o’er tilth, o’er waste, and the rich outlook enjoys the 
lands about as though its own” (Ausonius 1961, 249-51, lines 
320-326).  
However elaborate these may sound to us, he assures the reader a few 
lines later: “so great is the charm of its refinement and distinction, while its 
pleasures breed no excess” (Ausonius 1961, 253, line 348). 
The view of the Mosel described by Ausonius is in line with 
Collingwood’s idea of the Greek view of Nature, in which there is a natural 
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organic harmony connecting humanity and nature and a natural symmetry in 
the relationship between the two. The description of the villas reveals an effort 
to minimize the kind of violence that Tschumi discusses. The harmony 
Ausonius describes is natural, but it is not necessarily self-sustaining; it must 
consciously be maintained. Ausonius’s references to the excess of needless 
wealth and the boundaries between humanity and nature speak to the 
necessity of the individual being mindful of actions. 
Some fourteen centuries after Ausonius, George Waring Jr. describes his 
trip down the Mosel in The Bride of the Rhine: Two Hundred Miles in a Mosel 
Row Boat (1878). Identifying it as “the pearl of German rivers,” Waring 
observes that although “Metz and Trier have been touched by the railway, 
which has somewhat torn the veil from over them …, even they have held out 
bravely, and once beyond their gates we wander again in the charmed light of 
the Middle Ages” (Waring 1878, 15). On the very next page, he writes: “I have 
seen no country equal to the Mosel Valley for the peculiar charm that comes of 
antiquity made real by an appropriate human life” (Waring 1878, 16). What he 
might mean by this is revealed in a later chapter recounting his party’s visit to 
Trier:  
If the rain has wetted the country roads, one is awaked at dawn 
by the clattering of sabots on the stones, and the streets are filled 
in the early morning with peasant men driving wagons, drawn by 
cows yoked from the horns; with broad backed peasant-women 
carrying knapsack-like baskets heavily laden with potatoes, or 
with grain; and one is greeted by a variety of street sights and 
sounds entirely unfamiliar to the American ear (Waring 1878, 
85). 
Proceeding downstream from Metz, Waring notes that they go through 
the last lock of the canalization of the Mosel. There will be no other man-made 
stops to hinder the traveler the rest of the way to the Rhine. It will not be until 
after the Second World War that the three additional existing locks are 
constructed. Waring’s account is idyllic to say the least. He revels in describing 
his meals and lodging and his interactions with the local inhabitants. He enjoys 
recounting various legends associated with the Mosel and offers Ausonius’s 
poem at the end of his own book. It is fairly clear that while his book is not in 
verse, he envisions it as a modern complement to the work of “The Old Roman 
Poet”—his reference to Ausonius. 
Waring’s description of the Mosel valley is an interesting combination 
of all three of Collingwood’s categories: the Greek, the Renaissance, and the 
Modern. His phrase “made real by an appropriate human life” harkens to a time 
past with people living simply and in harmony with nature. At the same time, 
Waring’s pleasure at noting that the railroad was situated far enough away as 
to not disturb his afternoon, illustrates the impact of the Renaissance view of 
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nature—which laid the intellectual foundation for industrialization—although 
he certainly does not refer to it as such. 
The juxtaposition and tension between the industrial and pre-industrial 
is readily apparent as he runs out of river to meander down. Waring writes: 
It would seem proper to put a period to this long account of a 
journey down the Mosel by describing Koblenz with some 
minuteness. But Koblenz, although an extremely old town, is at 
the same time, a busy modern town, and any account of it must be 
pitched in a key that would throw the whole story of our idling 
along the beautiful river, among its medieval towns, and through 
its outlying pastoral villages, sadly into discord. Any guidebook of 
the Rhine will give an account of Koblenz and its history that is 
well worth reading, —but to me, its chief interest will always lie 
in the fact that at the wharf above its Roman bridge one may take 
a steamer to Kochem or Trier (Waring 1877, 255).  
In this closing passage it is clear that our traveler views the Mosel has 
being part of a different time and place than the busy modern world. Koblenz is 
the gateway between the Mosel and the modern world. However, it is worth 
noting that while he went down the Mosel in a row boat, he mentions taking a 
steamer up the river. In spite of the fondness with which he recounts his 
journey and his time spent among the medieval towns and pastoral villages, 
Waring is also forward looking. 
After regretting that he had not planned enough time for this trip, for 
each new twist in the Mosel between Schloss Ehrenburg and Koblenz reveals a 
new site that they did not have time to give due attention to, Waring writes:  
There comes, also, the longing for the day when pocket 
photography will be cheap and easy and when we who write shall 
not have to contend against the cost of engraving. The old men 
and old women of the Mosel—and the chubby little children, and 
the young men and maidens are all clamoring for admission to my 
pages; but alas! They and their picturesque old houses must await 
the coming of the happy day when photography and the printing 
press shall be really wedded. They are betrothed now, but there 
are costly formalities still standing between them Waring 1877, 
246-48). 
The two quotations, only a few pages apart from each other, reveal a 
tension that is fundamental to the modern age and humanity’s relation with 
nature. On the one hand, Waring is looking forward to the inevitable 
improvement in technology that will reduce the cost of image reproduction in 
books. On the other hand, the images that he wants to reproduce are of areas 
and people who have been minimally affected by the advances in 
industrialization and technology that would make the reproduction possible. 
More than a century before Worster, Waring is displaying the same sense of 
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nostalgia and loss that Worster laments. A disconnection with nature is at the 
heart of this sense of nostalgia and loss. 
Asymmetry in Ethics and Environmentalism 
In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger argues that technology has 
fundamentally altered how people think, see, and live in the world. In a fashion 
that highlights Waring’s predicament, Heidegger writes, “Everywhere we 
remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or 
deny it” (Heidegger 1977, 4). The asymmetrical relationship between humanity 
and nature leaves mankind in control and bound to nature. The cause of this 
bondage is an epistemological turn which results in human beings looking at 
nature through a lens of modern science whose essence “entraps nature as a 
calculable coherence of forces” (Heidegger 1977, 21). Heidegger notes that the 
relationship between technology and physics is correct; but at the same time 
the relationship has transformed how human beings interact with nature. 
Heidegger writes:  
Hence physics, in all its retreating from the representation turned 
only toward objects that has alone been standard until recently, 
will never be able to renounce this one thing: that nature reports 
itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation 
and that it remains orderable as a system of information 
(Heidegger 1977, 23).  
The consequences of this perspective are seen in modern technology. 
The windmill using wind for energy does not reflect the same view of nature as 
mining the earth for coal or refitting a section of the Rhine for a hydroelectric 
plant. The actions for these three examples are extraordinarily dissimilar, but 
nonetheless require a certain kind of knowledge about the environment. The 
former requires a familiarity of weather patterns and knowing, literally, which 
way the wind blows. It takes an aspect of the natural environment, in this case 
the wind, as it is and uses it to produce energy without altering the source of 
the energy. The latter two examples are based on modern scientific knowledge 
and require a fundamental altering of the environment in order to provide 
energy. Once coal is mined and used, it is gone and cannot be reused. The river 
that powers the hydroelectric plant may remain a river, but it has been altered 
significantly and, as the history of the Rhine confirms, requires continual 
adjustments to offset the unintended consequences of human intervention. 
Both kinds of technological interaction are based on an understanding or 
knowledge of nature, but the former relationship is symmetrical and the latter 
two are clearly asymmetrical. Heidegger traces the origin of the term 
“technology” from Technikon, meaning “that which belongs to techne” 
(Heidegger 1977, 12). He continues with the observation that techne has 
always been linked to episteme and that both words represent a very broad 
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sense of knowing, implying a sense of understanding and expertise (Heidegger 
1977, 13). 
In On the Soul, Aristotle writes that: 
Knowledge of the essential nature of a substance is largely 
promoted by an acquaintance with its properties: For when we 
are able to give an account conformable to experience of all or 
most of the properties of a substance, we shall be in the most 
favorable position to say something worth saying about the 
essential nature of a subject; in all demonstration a definition of 
essence is required as a starting point, so that definitions which 
do not enable us to discover the incidental properties, or which 
fail to facilitate even a conjecture about them, must obviously, 
one and all, be dialectical and futile (Aristotle 1984, 402b21-
403b2, 642).  
Knowledge becomes a social process based on consensus, and in a 
sense utility. From this perspective, the banks of a river do not come forth 
because of the bridge; they are banks and are identified as such because they 
are part of the properties that a river possesses. The river has a dynamic of its 
own that is independent of humanity. Humans gain knowledge of the river (or 
of nature) when they interact with it. It is a matter of action and inter-action, 
not of thinking or language. 
 In a sense, the phronimos, Aristotle’s ethically wise person, borrows 
goods from the river to sustain herself. In this process, the person acquires a 
debt, which arises because of need, not due to the ephemeral. John Scott notes 
that: 
Aristotle’s practically wise dweller is not enabled by the mere 
material possession of her dwelling in this instrumental way. The 
two kinds of needs are of different orders. One need constitutes a 
‘there’ or a place, a soul erotically and generatively open to any 
and all possible satisfactions, any and all goods that actually 
support living well. The need for the [weaving] shuttle, on the 
other hand is less open. The need for the shuttle is instrumental 
and hypothetical, not generative (Scott 2002, 142).  
From Heidegger’s perspective, modern technology has turned 
humanity’s relationship with nature into the second kind of order, merely 
instrumental. In Heidegger’s language, nature has becoming nothing more than 
a “standing reserve” (Heidegger 1977). 
Modern environmentalists have embraced Heidegger’s thinking about 
technology and its relationship to nature. However, many environmentalists 
have not escaped the epistemological trap that Heidegger had identified with 
modern science and technology. In “The Death of Environmentalism. Global 
Warming Politics in a Post-environmental World”—an essay that created a bit 
of stir when it was first presented in 2004—Michael Shellenberger and Ted 
Nordhaus argued that by focusing purely on global warming policy and 
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projects environmentalists have marginalized themselves from public debate 
and have not been nearly as effective as they would like to be. They need to 
consider the broader scope of environmental problems the global community 
faces. By advocating policy measures that attempt to address environmental 
issues in a purely scientific way, Nordhaus and Shellenberger suggest that 
environmentalists have isolated themselves from possible political allies who, 
although they might not share the same passion about the issues, could provide 
valuable political support. 
Shellenberger and Nordhaus argue further that “the environmental 
movement’s incuriosity about the interests of potential allies depends on it 
never challenging the most basic assumptions about what does and does not 
get counted as ‘environmental.’ Because we define environmental problems so 
narrowly, environmental leaders come up with equally narrow solutions” 
(Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2004, 9-10.) The authors point out that many 
environmentalists make the common mistake of “advocat[ing] technical policy 
solutions as though politics didn’t matter” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2004, 
25). Shellenberger and Nordhaus point to the New Apollo Project as a step in 
the right direction since it integrates multiple political interests for a common 
good. The plan to create a workable majority for environmental issues is 
perhaps an improvement, but it is not enough politically or epistemologically. 
Shellenberger and Nordhaus write, “Environmentalism is today more 
about protecting a supposed ‘thing’—‘the environment’—than advancing the 
world view articulated by Sierra Club founder John Muir, ‘When we try to pick 
out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the Universe’” 
(Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2004, 9). Shellenberger and Nordhaus suggest 
that thinking about “the environment” as a thing rather than as a mental 
category results in environmentalists doing “their work as though these are 
literal rather than figurative truths” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2004 12-
13). They point to a blind spot in much of the modern thinking about the 
environment that is fundamentally anthropocentric and instrumentalist. Nature 
is thought of as a thing that can be acted upon and controlled/protected rather 
than as part of the world that humans and non-humans live in and share. 
A quick return to Ausonius might be helpful here. Ausonius’s poem is 
ostensibly about a trip he took from Bingen to Trier. But it is much richer than 
it appears. The description of the water as transparent gives the impression 
that it holds no secrets, but that transparency soon gives way to the reflection of 
the vineyards on the hills. There is a boundary between the super and 
subaqueous realms that must not be violated. Ausonius’s playful description of 
the failure of the Satyrs to grasp the elusive Nymphs was indicative of the 
proper relation between the two worlds of air and water. The description of the 
boys fishing on the banks reveals the violence of the transgression:  
All unsuspecting, the wandering finny tribe rush upon them 
agape; and when—too late! —their open gullets feel the 
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concealed barbs pierce deep within, they struggle and their 
struggles are betrayed above, when the wand bends in response 
to the tremulous vibrations of the quivering line (Ausonius 1961, 
243 lines 250-53). 
 Ausonius’s almost idyllic journey down the Mosel provides an insight 
into how to approach thinking about rivers in a new way. Ausonius’s 
meditation is a journey, an action. And it might be in action that we find a way 
to think about rivers and other built or built upon spaces differently. John Scott 
argues that for Heidegger, language provides a place where mortals eternally 
search for meaning as dwellers, but at the same time language conceals this 
true meaning. Norberg-Schulz approvingly cites Heidegger’s comment about 
language being the first art (Norberg-Schulz 1988). Scott suggests that 
Aristotle’s attempt at a phenomenology of natural things that understood 
“presence as accommodated in a mediated and reflective way through a 
mechanism, not of production and use, but of acts based on debt and various 
kinds of possession, … make[s] it possible not just to die well, but to live well” 
(Scott 2002, 126). 
Conclusion 
Where does “action” leave us in terms of how to think about the environment 
in a way that is not instrumental and overly anthropocentric? Or to rephrase 
the question: Is a return to a more symmetrical relationship between human 
beings and nature the key to creating an environmental policy and ethics that 
is more than glorified nostalgia? I think I have the beginnings of an answer. Part 
of the solution is to go from macro to micro in historical scope. Instead of 
viewing the problems of getting goods from Metz to Koblenz (the two navigable 
endpoints of the Mosel) and the process of how that was resolved, it may be 
more fruitful and interesting to view the interaction of the places and spaces 
along the way of the river. In western Germany the Mosel meanders along 
numerous small villages. Exploring the histories of these villages and how they 
interacted with the river, or managed their debt, to use Aristotle’s term, is a 
possible way to de-instrumentalize the Mosel. A way to do this that honors the 
notion of action and consensus that Scott suggests that Aristotle is aiming for is 
to employ a sociological method known as Actor Network Theory, or ANT. 
In Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, Bruno 
Latour offers a harsh critique of environmentalists and of “political ecology” in 
a way that echoes Heidegger’s critique, as well as those of Schellenberger and 
Nordhaus. Latour writes that “this nature becomes knowable through the 
intermediary of the sciences; it has been formed through networks of 
instruments; it is defined through the intervention of professions, disciplines, 
and protocols; it is distributed via databases; it is provided with arguments 
through learned societies” (Latour 2004, 4). Juxtaposed to this scientific 
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concern is an aesthetic one that seeks to protect nature. These two concerns 
seem to be irreconcilable. Latour notes:  
Every time we seek to mix scientific facts with aesthetic, political, 
economic and moral values, we find ourselves in a quandary. If 
we concede too much to facts, the human element in its entirety 
tilts into objectivity and becomes a countable and calculable 
thing, a bottom line in terms of energy, one species among others. 
If we concede too much to values, all of nature tilts into the 
uncertainty of myth, into poetry or romanticism; everything 
becomes soul and spirit. If we mix facts and values we go from 
bad to worse, for we are depriving ourselves of both autonomous 
knowledge and independent morality (Latour 2004, 4).  
Latour proposes a new approach, in his words literally a new 
Constitution, that will include both human and nonhuman as a way to 
transcend the difficulty outlined above. 
Latour’s approach is intriguing for it opens up the possibility of (re-
)establishing a symmetrical relationship between the human and nonhuman. If 
it is possible to change the view of nature as something calculable or as a 
“standing reserve,” it might be possible to arrive at a conservationist ethics that 
follows Scott’s view of Aristotle’s ethics, where the individual is mindful of his 
or her debt to others, both human and nonhuman, and acts accordingly. Scott 
notes in Plato’s Republic that Cephalus suggests that debt plays a key role in 
allowing him to be the human being that he is; the ability to repay integrates 
him into the social order. Recollection, Socrates’s key to knowledge, is crucial 
for a person to remember exactly what was borrowed and what is needed to 
repay the debt (Scott 2002). 
In terms of the environment, understanding our debt involves the 
realization that human interaction with the environment is an exchange where 
people who take from the environment (we all do) owe it a debt of sorts. In a 
real sense, the current situation is more dire than the one that Scott discusses 
in “Having a Need to Act” (2002); Scott touches upon the role of the State in 
Plato’s Republic to place restrictions on the seemingly limitless skills of the 
artists and technologist whose activity make the State possible. The twenty-first 
century world faces a similar predicament. The skill of the artists and 
technologists is virtually limitless. But limitless production is not desirable 
because it causes damage—perhaps irreparable damage—to the environment. 
The solution to the problem is not the philosopher-king, but rather a 
functioning political system along the lines of what Latour discusses where 
environmentalists, scientists, and economic interests cooperate in an effort to 
manage the debt that human beings acquire. It is a call for a politics that allows 
for a sustainable economy in a sustainable environment—a relationship in 
which human interaction with the environment is more symmetrical and less 
nostalgic. 
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Abstract: The need for constructing an environmental ethics that keeps 
sustainability in mind is the result of a collision of the realization that the 
natural environment is neither limitless nor impervious to actions with a view 
of nature that has been fundamentally instrumentalist and anthropocentric. 
This paper will borrow from architectural theory in an effort to do two things: 
First, it will point to some of the limitations of an anthropocentric view of 
nature and how it impacts efforts to influence environmental policy; second, it 
will suggest that ideas from Aristotle and Actor Network Theory can help to 
provide a paradigm within which we can think about nature in a way that 
offers an alternative framing of questions about the environment. 
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